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THE SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS*
In many states confidential communications between certain professionals
and their clients or patients are privileged, i.e., shielded from disclosure in a
judicial proceeding.' But few courts or legislatures have extended the shield
of privileged communications to the social worker-client relationship,2 not-
withstanding the useful function performed by the social work profession in
our society and the general necessity of confidentiality to the success of its
endeavors. The purposes of this note are: (1) to evaluate the arguments
for and against a social worker-client privilege in the light of modern con-
cepts of privilege and the needs of the social work profession, and (2) to
discuss the factors which must be weighed in granting a privilege to the
social work profession.
* Certain sections of this note are based upon portions of an unpublished paper en-
titled "Privileged Communications and the Social Worker" which was written during 1965
by Miss Donna Green and Miss Ronda Richardson, graduate students in the George War-
ren Brown School of Social Work, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. In con-
junction with their paper, Miss Green and Miss Richardson conducted a survey among
social work agencies in the St. Louis area in order to ascertain how frequently lack of
privilege presented problems and what policies, if any, were followed to compensate for
lack of protection. Twenty agencies were selected for study: four family agencies, two
settlement houses, five hospitals (city, state, private, general medical and psychiatric), one
child guidance clinic, two child protective agencies, one residential treatment center for
children, an agency which frequently dealt with children in the St. Louis city school sys-
tems, and four probation and parole departments. These agencies were selected on the
assumption that they represented all the kinds of agencies that exist in the city. However,
because the sample was neither randomly nor statistically chosen, the results may not be
entirely reliable. Both the survey and paper are on file at the George Warren Brown
School of Social Work Library, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. References
to these materials will hereinafter be cited as Green & Richardson (unpublished paper)
or (unpublished survey).
1. The policy behind privileged communications differs from that behind the rules of
incompetency; the latter exist to keep unreliable, prejudicial or misleading evidence out
of court, whereas the rules of privilege exist to protect relationships which are con-
sidered socially desirable. MCCORICK, EVIDENCE 151-52 (1954). See generally 8 Wia-
MoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285, 2290-329, 2380-91, 2394-96 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [herein-
after cited as WxcmoRa].
For the purposes of this note it will be assumed that confidential communications do
not violate the rule against hearsay evidence or any of the other rules of incompetency.
2. See 8 WiGmo, § 2286; LoGatto, Privileged Communication and the Social Worker,
8 CATHOLic LAw. 5 (1962); Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 590, 604 (1952). But see Re
Kryschuk & Zulynik, 14 D.L.R.2d 676 (Sask. Magis. Ct. 1958).
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I. A SKETCH OF THE SOCIAL WORK PROFESSION3
The goal of the social work profession is to help people learn to deal with
the pressures of life, a task once largely performed by doctors, lawyers and
clergymen." There are six major areas of specialization within the social
work profession: casework, group work, community organization, welfare
research, welfare administration and social action.5 Most of this discussion
will relate to casework, because it is the area which most often involves the
social worker-client relationship that allegedly deserves protection.
Casework is practiced in social agencies or social welfare settings. A social
agency has been described as "a community-sanctioned organization of re-
sources-money, services, manpower, and man-skills-to deal with certain
social problems." 6 Because there is such diversity of problems and needs,
there are many specialized agencies: family service agencies, child welfare
agencies, child protection and placement agencies, adoption agencies, pub-
lic welfare agencies, probation and parole agencies, settlement houses and
residential treatment centers. Other social agencies concern themselves
primarily with problems arising in areas such as schools, hospitals, the armed
services or industry. There is also a growing group of private practitioners,
such as marriage counselors and child guidance counselors, who supplement
the social agencies.
The casework method is essentially a counseling process consisting of
three steps: (1) the gathering and recording of factual data, the study;
(2) the social worker's interpretation of the study, the diagnosis; and (3)
his suggested treatment.' The first step, and to some extent the other two as
well, is accomplished mainly through interviews with the client and other
persons possessing relevant information.
The caseworker keeps very detailed notes of his interviews during which
he records his own thoughts and impressions as well as the statements and ac-
tions of his client. These records serve primarily as a working tool for the
social worker and the professional persons within the agency and in other
agencies with whom he consults.
Thus, many persons may eventually have access to the records of a par-
ticular social worker-client relationship. But all of these persons have one
thing in common-they are engaged in treating the particular client.' Social
3. This section is substantially based upon portions of Green & Richardson (unpub-
lished paper).
4. Id. at 1.
5. Ibid.
6. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 704 (Lurie ed. 1965.)
7. BIESTEK, THE CASEWORK RELATIONSHIP 134 (1957).
8. The social worker's records are not merely a receptacle of information to be dis-
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workers do not contend that their records and personal knowledge about a
client, gathered through professional contacts, should be privileged, until
outsiders, and particularly the courts, seek access to such information for
purposes which the social workers feel do not serve their clients' best inter-
ests.9
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE
A. History of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The notion of privileged communications originated during the sixteenth
century when confidentiality was granted to the attorney-client relationship
as "a natural exception to the then novel right of testimonial compulsion."' 1
The privilege was based upon "consideration for the oath and the honor of
the attorney."'" Contrary to today's law, the privilege was reserved pri-
marily to the lawyer and oniy incidentally to the client; it could be asserted
by the lawyer even though his client desired that he testify. 2 This doctrine
began to lose favor during the eighteenth century because "the judicial
carded once the client has been helped. Since they illustrate many of the techniques
employed by the caseworker throughout his contact with his client, they are often used
as teaching materials. Furthermore, the records may be used for statistical purposes by
persons doing research or by the agency as a means of keeping records of its activities.
The permission of the client is always obtained before records of his treatment are used
as teaching materials or for statistical purposes by persons not employed by the agency.
Apparently not all agencies feel that they should obtain the client's permission if the
records are used to compile records of the agency's activities, so long as the data do not
provide a clue to his identity. Green & Richardson 3 (unpublished paper).
9. Social workers are apparently willing to testify whenever they feel that they can
promote their client's interests. Because the information is obtained by the agency to
assist it in helping the client, "the release of information is then valid only in the fulfill-
ment of our functions and objective in making the services of the agency most completely
available to him." Miller, The Confidential Relationship in Social Work Administration,
69 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 574, 578 (1942).
The essential function of social agencies, both public and private, embodying
a confidential relationship between client and case worker, makes it advisable that
we work toward the goal of legal protection by obtaining for case material the
status of privileged information. It seems both ethical and fitting that profes-
sional social workers should seek to safeguard confidences which might operate
disadvantageously for their clients in cases of court action brought up by some-
one outside the agency. Serota, Trubin, Thomas & Beaumont, The Protection of
Case Material, The Compass, May 1939, p. 8.
[T]he scope and purposes of the relationship must at all times constitute the
agency's guide in interpreting what use of information is or is not legally and
socially justifiable. Like every other privilege it seeks to afford protection against
"compulsory" disclosure for purposes unrelated to those for which it was given.
Smith, Reintegrating Our Concepts of Privileged Communications, 16 SOCIAL SER-
VICE REv. 191, 205 (1942).
10. 8 WIGMOR- § 2290, at 543; see A Critical Examination of Some Evidentiary
Privileges: A Symposium, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 206, 235 (1961).
11. 8 WIGMORE § 2290, at 543.
12. Id. at 544.
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search for truth could not endure to be obstructed by a voluntary pledge of
secrecy, nor was there any moral delinquency or public odium in breaking
one's pledge under force of law.""
With the disappearance of the "oath and honor" theory, a new hypo-
thesis was proffered: that assurance of confidentiality was necessary to pro-
vide "subjectively for the client's freedom of apprehension in consulting his
legal adviser."' 4 Under this new theory the privilege belonged to the client,
and if he did not desire protection, his laywer could not assert it." Further-
more, under the old theory, the privilege was "limited to communications
received since the beginning of the litigation at bar and for its purposes
only," but under the new theory, secrecy was eventually extended to "any
consultation for legal advice, wholly irrespective of litigation or even of
controversy."' 6
B. The Modern Theory of Privilege
The modem theory underlying all professional-client or -patient privi-
leges is that protection from forced disclosures is justified only if the social
utility of the professional relationship is so great that it outweighs society's
interest in the correct disposition of litigation.' Confidentality is protected
13. Id. at 543.
14. Ibid. Jeremy Bentham disputed this new theory because he thought that a wrong-
doer should not be protected at the expense of society. The lawyer was not voluntarily
violating the client's confidence but was being compelled by the court to disclose informa-
tion for the benefit of society. Wigmore criticized Bentham's reasoning with the follow-
ing arguments: (1) there are in civil cases no hard and fast lines between guilt and in-
nocence; (2) in criminal cases one can apply the reasoning that is behind the fifth
amendment; (3) the client will derive more good from his attorney if the attorney knows
all the facts; and (4) a privilege brings the lawyer's ethics and the law into harmony.
Id. § 2291, at 549-53.
15. In the first half of the nineteenth century the courts confused the new and the
old theories. Thus, until the new theory was accepted as dominant, confusion existed over
who had standing to object to the admission of evidence. Id. § 2290, at 543-44.
Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client,
16 CALIF. L. Rv. 487, 492-93 (1928), points out that the old theory still affects modern
reasoning, though it is not admitted by the courts.
16. 8 WIGNIOR § 2290, at 544-45.
17. See id. § 2291, at 549. Louisell & Crippin, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L.
REv. 413, 414 (1956), states that: "[lit is ... clear that in the judgment of western so-
ciety, this [privileged communication] is not too great a price to pay for the value of
secrecy in certain human relationships, notably in the United States those of clergyman-
penitent, lawyer-client, doctor-patient, and husband-wife."
[T]he law of privileged communication is a significant expression of the law's
concern or regard for the security of the individual as a participant in relationships
which the state considers it important to foster and protect and, it should be
added, for the security and sanctity of the relationship itself. Smith, Reintegrating
Our Concepts of Privileged Communications, 16 SocIAL SzRvicE Rav. 191, 193
(1942).
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because it is indispensable to the establishment of the particular working
relationship. But the primary question is not whether confidentiality is nec-
essary to the relationship, but whether the relationship is necessary to society.
C. Guidelines of Privilege
Modem authorities have accepted the four requirements set forth by
Wigmore as the conditions which must be satisfied in order to justify a
privilege.
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation."8
Wigmore's requirements have been employed (1) by scholars in deter-
mining whether a state legislature should grant a privilege to a new rela-
tionship, " and (2) by judges in determining whether a privilege should be
allowed in the cases before them.20 His requirements are the basis of much
subsequent discussion.
III. EXISTING LAW PERTAINING TO THE
SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Legislative Enactments and Administrative Rules That
Apparently Encompass the Social Worker-Client Relationship
Despite the fact that communications with such sundry professionals as
doctors,2 psychiatrists,2" psychologists,23 registered nurses, 24 and journalists
18. 8 WioszoRE § 2285, at 527.
19. The following apply Wigmore's guideposts to determine whether a new profes-
sional-client or patient relationship deserves a legislative privilege. Fisher, The Psycho-
therapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNe L. Rv.
609 (1964); Note, 47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 384 (1952) (psychotherapists); Note, 106 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 266 (1957) (marriage counsellors); 4 KAN. L. Rv. 597 (1956) (psycho-
therapists).
20. In the following cases, the courts applied Wigmore's requirements to ascertain if
a privilege was justified. Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 Pac. 531 (1919); State
v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 177 P.2d 689 (1947); State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe,
25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946); Re Kryschuk & Zulynik, 14 D.L.R.2d 676 (Sask.
Magis. Ct. 1958).
21. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953).
22. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418(5) (Supp. 1963).
23. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 1883.110 (1961).
24. ORE. REv. STAT. § 44.040(1) (g) (1963).
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and accountants 5 are protected by statutes in some states, no legislature
has explicitly granted a privilege for communications to the social worker.
However, the relationship is sometimes indirectly afforded protection be-
cause it is included within some other grant of privilege.
A few statutes declare that public officers cannot be forced to testify.
26
Certain social workers, such as juvenile, probation or parole officers conceiv-
ably come within the scope of such a privilege.
Also many state legislatures, either in conjunction with federal grant-in-
aid programs27 or on their own initiative, have enacted statutes granting a
privilege to participants in particular welfare programs. Information may
be privileged if it was given to adoption " or health and safety agencies, "
mental institutions,"' maternity hospitals"' or departments of unemployment
compensation;" or if it appears in drug addiction,3 alcoholism,'4 venereal
25. See McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 166.
26. E.g., CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 1881(5); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 153-1-7(5)
(1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.040(l)(e) (1963). The extension of the privilege to
"public officers" can be interpreted as covering all branches of the government.
27. See notes 82-96 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of these programs
and the provisions for the safeguarding of certain information which the states must
satisfy before they receive federal funds.
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.27 (1964) (records and court files); HAWAII REv. LAws
§ 57-23(d) (1955) (adoption certificates); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (1964)
(adoption records); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.14 (Supp. 1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
1-708(b) (Supp. 1965) (records of adoption proceedings).
29. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.120 (1962) (Department of Health and Safety); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 35, § 101, art. 43, § 1-I (Supp. 1965) (State Board of Health and Mental
Hygiene); Wis. STAT. § 163.10 (Supp. 1965) (Health Assistance Payments Act).
30. ALASKA STAT. § 47.05.020 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2256 (1964)
(mental hospitals); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 101, art. 43, § 1-I (Supp. 1965) (State
Board of Health and Mental Hygiene); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-8.1 (1964) (hospitals
for mentally disordered); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1034.12 (1962) (information received
by Mental Health Commission).
31. IowA CODE § 236.28 (1946); see note 45 infra.
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.16(3) (1952); HAWAi REV. LAWS § 93-94 (1955); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 640 (Supp. 1964); NE. REV. STAT. § 612.265 (1963); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 96-23 (1965); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 221(1) (1951).
33. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 398.18(1) (1960); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2374
(1964); MIss. CODE ANN. § 436-09 (1956).
34. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4410 (Supp. 1961) (applicable only to voluntary
patients); Miss. CODE ANN. § 436-09 (1956).
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disease,s eye disease,"6 probation and parole,37 or child welfare records;"s
or in the records of social welfare,"9 vocational rehabilitation," juvenile
court,41 probation and parole,42 or domestic relations proceedings.43
The agency-participant privilege is conferred in one of two ways: (1) di-
rectly through a statute enacted by the state legislature4 ' or (2) indirectly
through a statute which allows a department of the state to set up standards
that an agency must meet in order to obtain a license."' In the latter case,
the department usually requires that the agency maintain confidential rec-
ords to obtain and to retain its license.
35. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 269 (1958) (no privilege for Wasserman test or quarantine);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1093, 1094 (1964).
36. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, § 107 (1956).
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2720 (Supp. 1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3119 (1956);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 4004-16 (1956); Mo. REV. STAT. § 549.151 (Supp. 1963); Nyv.
Rv. STAT. §§ 62.120, 213.1098 (1963); NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.350 (1959); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-207 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-579 (1962); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-332
(1957).
38. ALA. CODE tit. 49, § 76 (1958) (records of child-care institutions); IowA CODE
§ 238.24 (Supp. 1964) (records of child placement agency); IowA CODE § 239.10
(Supp. 1964) (records of aid to dependent children); Mo. RyV. STAT. § 201.120 (1959)
(records of services to crippled children); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-155.3 (Supp. 1963)
(records of aid to dependent children); S.C. CODE ANN. § 71-238 (1962) (information
of child welfare agency about children and relatives).
39. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 42 (1964); N.Y. SoC. WELFARE LAW § 136(2);
ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 411.320 (1963).
40. MNN. STAT. § 121.33 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 71-285 (1962).
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-67 (1958) (conversation of judge with child whose
case is before court); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2432 (1959) (information obtained and social
records prepared by employees); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3119 (1956) (records of proba-
tion officer submitted to courts); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 795 (1962) (information ob-
tained by court officers or employees); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.567 (1963); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-209 (1960) (not applicable to criminal offense).
42. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 945.10 (Supp. 1964) (parole commission communication);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 4004-16 (1956) (parole board information); Mo. REv. STAT. §
549.285 (1959) (information from parole officers).
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 957 (Supp. 1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.600 (1963) (ex-
tends to advice of court or counselors).
44. See notes 28-43 supra and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 197.010-.120 (1959). The hospital licensing law
gives the Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri the right to promulgate
rules and regulations for the licensing of hospitals. Mo. DP'T OF PUBLIO HEALTIH &
WELFARE, REGULATIONS AND CODES FOR MATERNITY HOSPITALS § 3, No. 6(7) (1961)
says:
Case records shall be 'kept on all cases involving unwed mothers and their in-
fants and shall be deemed confidential and shall be protected from unauthorized
examination. The case record of the mother shall include the social history, the
diagnosis, the formulation of the casework plan, and the implementation of the
plan. (Emphasis added.)
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The agency-participant privilege statutes differ greatly with respect to
(1) the scope of the information protected by the statute and (2) the ex-
tent to which the information is protected. As to the scope of the informa-
tion protected, the legislatures have followed two paths. Some statutes limit
the privilege only to records.4" Other statutes apparently shield all infor-
mation that is divulged.47 In limiting the extent to which the information is
protected, the legislatures have taken three positions. One type of statute is
apparently designed to shield completely the confidential information; it
allows the information to be used only for the purpose for which it was ob-
tained.," Other statutes will protect confidential information only so long
as the detriment to justice is minimal; these confer discretion upon the trial
judge to make this decision.49 A final type of statute prohibits the public
from obtaining the privileged information but does not mention any limita-
tions upon disclosure forced by the judiciary."0
Another distinction, which appears in a few statutes, is between crim-
nal prosecutions and civil cases, with confidential information being shielded
from forced disclosure only in civil cases.51 These statutes have pre-empted
the judge's discretion and predetermined that ascertainment of the truth
rather than confidentiality is always more important in a criminal trial.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Statutes
Regardless of what type of statute is being interpreted by the court, a
privilege cannot be claimed unless (1) the relationship protected by the
statute has been established,52 (2) the right to claim the privilege has not
46. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.27 (1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 238.24 (1946); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 201.120 (1959).
47. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-67 (1958); Mo. REv. STAT. § 549.285 (1959);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 795 (1962).
48. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-67 (1958).
49. E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2233 (Supp. 1961) (privilege waived at dis-
cretion of judge if in defendant's interest); Mo. REV. STAT. § 549.151 (Supp. 1963)
(privilege waived at discretion of judge if in defendant's interest). The discretionary
statute and order of the judge statutes fulfill the same purpose at the trial level in that
evidence will be admitted at the discretion of the trial judge. However, at least theo-
retically, the appellate court may be able to overrule the trial judge if he abuses his dis-
cretion under a discretionary statute; it may not be able to do so under an order of the
judge statute. See note 59 infra for a statute which confers discretion upon the comis-
sioner of an agency to determine whether information given to that agency should be
disclosed.
50. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 107 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
51. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-209 (1960) (privilege not available in a criminal
trial).
52. See Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 Pac. 531 (1919) (juvenile court never
obtained jurisdiction over minor).
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been waived s and (3) the person who claims the privilege is the individual
entitled to it under the statute.5 '
Few cases are on record which interpret the various types of statutes.
Two conflicting conclusions can be drawn from this fact: (1) no privilege
is needed or (2) the privilege has been so universally accepted that few
litigants have chosen to attack it. The first explanation can be refuted
because a single application of the privilege might justify its existence; the
second conclusion can be disputed in view of the success of the few contest-
ants who have challenged the statutes.
Contestants of the discretionary statutes have been successful in securing
the admission of evidence that might have been privileged. In Lindsey v.
People,5" a juvenile court judge refused to testify in a murder trial about a
conversation which he had had with a juvenile. The judge was cited for
contempt and he defended on the ground that he was immune from testify-
ing under a statutory privilege for public officers. The Colorado court noted
that the defendant had overlooked the statutory phrase, "in the judgment
of the court""8 and dismissed his argument on the ground that Wigmore's
fourth requirement was not met.5" In People v. Feuerstein,5 the court
53. See People v. Feuerstein, 161 Misc. 426, 293 N.Y. Supp. 239 (Queens County
Ct. 1936); State v. BLxby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 175, 177 P.2d 689, 706 (1947). In the
Feuerstein case the participants in the agency program tried to claim a privilege to keep a
representative of the agency from testifying in court. The court said:
certain it is that where one takes advantage of the benefits of a governmental
agency, and then publicly discloses his relationship with the governmental agency,
and a question then arises as to whether or not he has testified truthfully with
reference to his relations with the governmental agency, the rule of confidential re-
lationship must be deemed waived. State v. Feuerstein, supra at 428, 293 N.Y.
Supp. at 241-42.
54. See Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 Pac. 531 (1919); State v. Bixby, 27
Wash. 2d 144, 174, 177 P.2d 689, 705 (1947). In the Bixby case, the judge of a ju-
venile court was subpoenaed to testify about a conference he had had with a juvenile
and her parents. He was convicted of subornation of perjury and on appeal he claimed
a privilege by virtue of statutes which said that juvenile court proceedings were con-
fidential. The court would not allow a privilege; it interpreted the statutes as meaning
that standing to object to the admission of evidence belonged solely to the juvenile.
55. Supra note 54.
56. The statute before the court recites: "A public officer shall not be examined as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the public interests, in the judg-
ment of the court, would suffer by the disclosure." Id. at 353-54, 181 Pac. at 535.
(Emphasis added.)
57. Id. at 355-56, 181 Pac. at 586; accord, State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 174-75,
177 P.2d 689, 705-06 (1947). The Bixby case involved the testimony of a judge of a
juvenile court in a criminal action for subornation of perjury. The court relied upon
the Lindsey case, even though in this case the judge did not object to testifying, and
reached the conclusion that Wigmore's fourth postulate was not satisfied. The statute
said, "A public officer shall not be examined as a witness as to communications made to
him in official confidence, when the public interest would suffer by the disclosure." State
v. Bixby, supra at 174, 177 P.2d at 705. The court considered this a discretionary statute.
53. 161 Misc. 426, 293 N.Y. Supp. 239 (Queens County Ct. 1936).
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allowed a representative of the Home Relief Bureau to testify over the ob-
jection of Feuerstein who had received relief from the bureau. Feuerstein
had objected that the information which he had given to the Bureau was
privileged under a statute which said that information could be disclosed
only "to a person or agency considered by the commissioner to be entitled to
such information." 9 The court, without inquiring into whether the com-
missioner had actually given the representative authority to testify, assumed
that he had and allowed the evidence to be given.6"
Finally, although the statutes which restrict the use of the information to
the purpose for which it was obtained appear to grant a privilege, the courts
have interpreted them as applying only to voluntary disclosures and not to
forced disclosures by witnesses subpoenaed to testify in court.61 Further-
more, in one case it was held that such a statute granted a privilege only if
the court felt that the allegedly protected relation satisfied Wigmore's re-
quirements.6 - According to this interpretation, the judge has the discretion
to refuse to apply such a statute in each particular case.
One court has liberally construed a statute in order to uphold a privilege.
In Smith v. Illinois Valley Ice Cream Co.," a litigant attempted to circum-
vent a statutory privilege applying only to records by trying to compel the
representative of an agency to testify from his personal knowledge. The
court rejected this distinction, saying, "we cannot distinguish between the
use of the records and the 'fruit' of the records."" 4
While an insufficient number of cases exists to characterize as hostile the
59. The case was based upon the following statute:
All communications and information relating to a person receiving relief or
service from a public welfare district obtained by any public welfare official or
employee in the course of his work shall be considered confidential and shall be dis-
closed only ... by authority of the Commissioner, to a person or agency considered
by the Commissioner entitled to such information. Id. at 427, 293 N.Y. Supp. at
241.
60. Id. at 428, 293 N.Y. Supp. at 242.
61. See Bell v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co., 327 Ill. App. 321, 64 N.E.2d 204 (1945)
(voluntary but not involuntary disclosure forbidden); State v. Church, 35 Wash. 2d 170,
211 P.2d 701 (1949) (voluntary but not involuntary disclosure forbidden). Dictum in
State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946) lends support
to this interpretation: "It is an inherent power of a court of justice, within the sphere
of its jurisdiction, to compel witnesses to appear before it and testify concerning any rele-
vant facts within their knowledge, in a case then pending in that court." Id. at 167, 169
P.2d 710.
62. State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, supra note 61.
63. 20 Ill. App. 2d 312, 156 N.E.2d 361 (1959).
64. Id. at 320, 156 N.E.2d at 365. The Attorney General of Kansas said that the
spirit, if not the letter of the law, would be violated if the sheriff or county attorney
were allowed to testify to information in juvenile court records. Letter From John Ander-
son, Jr., Attorney General of Kansas, Nov. 5, 1957, in 6 KAr. L. Rav. 396 (1958).
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judiciary's attitude towards a social worker-client privilege, the cases do
apparently show a tendency to circumvent a statutory privilege whenever
possible. One explanation for this tendency may be the courts' feeling that
upholding a privilege will not aid the particular agency-participant relation-
ship involved since the reason for initiation of the relationship may no
longer exist or the relationship may have already been terminated. Another
possible explanation might be that the trial judge generally weighs only the
effect of a privilege in the case before him and not the broader considera-
tions involved. When a court considers the effect that rejecting the privilege
may have on other relationships, both present and future, it seems more
likely that a statutory privilege will be upheld."8
C. Independent Action by the Judiciary
In the absence of statutory warrant, very few litigants have claimed a
privilege for the social worker-client relationship. As a result, there are not
enough reported cases to indicate whether the judiciary feels that it should
independently grant a privilege.
Only three cases have granted protection to confidential communications
between a social worker and his client in the absence of a statutory pro-
vision." Three widely differing approaches were employed: (1) explicitly
65. See Coopersberg v. Taylor, 148 Misc. 824, 266 N.Y. Supp. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
The court felt that the purpose of the statute was to protect the identity of persons ac-
cepting relief so that others would not be discouraged from applying.
66. The three cases are: Simrin v. Simrin, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
People v. Quinn, 61 Cal. 2d 551, 39 Cal. Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705 (1964); Re Kryschuk
& Zulynik, 14 D.L.R.2d 676 (Sask. Magis. Ct. 1958). These cases will be discussed in
this order in the immediately following text.
Others have attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the judiciary to grant independently
of statute a privilege for certain relations. In Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 Pac.
531 (1919), a juvenile court judge tried to avoid testifying about a conversation he had
with a child by arguing that the communications in question were of the same nature as
communications between an attorney and client. The Colorado court dismissed this con-
tention because there was a state statute which expressly forbids a juvenile court judge
from practicing law. Similarly, the court in Simrin v. Simrin, supra, said that communi-
cations with a rabbi who practiced marriage counselling were not protected by a statutory
privilege covering only confessions in the course of discipline required by the church.
See generally 8 WIOMoRE §§ 2394-96.
The judiciary could sometimes shield confidential communications between a social
worker and his client by considering the social worker as the agent of a professional per-
son, such as a doctor or a lawyer, whose communications with his client are privileged.
See 8 WioamORE § 2301; Note, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 76 (1955). Some states resolve the
agency issue by statutory enactment. An example 'is a New York statute which protects
communications made to a doctor, dentist, registered nurse, or licensed practical nurse.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LA-.v § 4504; see Note, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 263, 267 (1961).
Another argument presented in favor of the claim of privilege in the Lindsey case was
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recognizing a social worker-client privilege; (2) upholding the legality of a
contract to suppress evidence and (3) expanding the involuntary confession
rule.
1. Outright Recognition of a Privilege
No American court has explicitly acknowledged that the social worker-
client relationship is privileged, but one Canadian case, Re Kryschuk &
Zulynik,67 has been interpreted as doing so.6" Margaret Brand, an employee
of the Department of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation in the Province of
Saskatchewan, counseled an unmarried mother and the alleged father in an
effort to help them settle their differences. Miss Brand was subpoenaed as
a witness by the unwed mother in a suit to determine whether the young
man was the father of the child. Every employee in the department, includ-
ing Miss Brand, had taken an oath of secrecy. 9 Objection to her testifying
was made by the defendant on the grounds of hearsay and privilege and by
the counsel for the welfare department on the basis of privilege. The court
dismissed the department's objection on the ground that the privilege must
be claimed by one of the parties concerned."
The court did not compel Miss Brand to testify, but it is somewhat doubt-
ful whether it did so because it recognized a social worker-client privilege.
True, the court said that the relationship between Miss Brand and the
unwed mother and the alleged father satisfied Wigmore's requirements and
thus deserved to be protected;71 but on the other hand it stated, "the evi-
dence proposed to be given by Margaret Brand in her capacity as an em-
ployee of the Department of Social Welfare is disallowed because of being
based upon "the supposed powers and duties conferred by the State, in its capacity of
parens patriae, upon plaintiff in error, [juvenile court judge] and his assumed position
in loco parentis." The Colorado court expressed the opinion that this was an interesting
argument, but dismissed this contention because no precedent existed for the proposition.
It was also questionable whether the claimed privilege existed even for a natural parent.
Lindsey v. People, supra at 355, 181 Pac. at 536.
67. 14 D.L.R.2d 676 (Sask. Magis. Ct. 1958).
68. 8 WiGMORE § 2286, at 535-36 n.26; Note, 71 YALn L.J. 1226, 1230-31 (1962).
In Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 349, 181 Pac. 531, 534 (1919), the court implied that
it would have granted a privilege if Wigmore's fourth requirement had been satisfied.
69. The report does not contain the text of the oath or a summary of it.
70. Re Kryschuk & Zulynik, 14 D.L.R.2d 676, 677-78 (Sask. Magis. Ct. 1958). The
court relied upon McTaggart v. McTaggart, [1948l 2 All E.R. 754 (C.A.), where a hus-
band had filed a petition for divorce on the grounds of desertion against his wife. The
husband and wife gave conflicting testimony of what had transpired in an interview with
a probation officer. The probation officer was called to testify and objected to being
forced to testify. The court said that the "privilege, if any, was the privilege of the
parties . . . ." Id. at 755.
71. Re Kryschuk & Zulynik, supra note 70, at 677.
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hearsay or privileged or both." 2 Also, it did not indicate whether it felt that
the privilege belonged to the agency-client relationship or to the social
worker-client relationship." Furthermore, because the court felt that there
was other evidence sufficient to prove that the child had been fathered by
the defendant, the outcome of the case was not affected by the granting of
the privilege."4 For these reasons, it is doubtful whether Re Kryschuk stands
for the recognition of a social worker-client privilege.
2. Upholding the Legality of a Contract to Suppress Evidence
One court has indirectly granted a privilege to the social worker-client
relationship by upholding the legality of a contract to suppress evidence.
In Simrin v. Simrin,7" a rabbi had undertaken marriage counseling with a
couple after they had agreed that their communications with him would be
confidential and that neither of them would call him as a witness in the
event of a divorce action. The rabbi had imposed these conditions so that
the couple would feel free to communicate with him. In a prior proceeding,
the husband had been awarded custody of the couple's four minor children;
in the case under discussion the wife sought modification of the custody
decree. The rabbi was called by the wife as a witness. He refused to testify,
not on the ground of privilege, but on the basis of his agreement with the
couple. The trial court ruled that he need not reveal the confidential con-
versations.
On appeal, the wife argued that if the court were to hold her to the
agreement, it would be sanctioning "a contract to suppress evidence con-
trary to public policy."7 The court answered that this policy was out-
weighed by the public policy of favoring "procedures designed to preserve
marriages, and counseling has become a promising means to that end."" It
pointed out that the very purpose of counseling would be frustrated if the
parties could not speak freely for fear of making an admission that might
72. Id. at 679.
73. The following factors possibly indicate that if a privilege was granted, it attached
to the agency-client relation: (1) an attorney for the Department of Welfare objected
to the admission of the evidence but no attorney objected to the admission of the evi-
dence in the name of the social worker; (2) all employees of the Department of Wel-
fare had taken an oath of secrecy, not just social workers; and (3) the court stated that
the privilege attached to communication with Miss Brand in her capacity as an em-
ployee of the Department of Welfare. Id. at 679-80.
74. Ibid. Because the evidence was not needed for the "correct disposal of litigation,"
it can be argued that the evidence was not omitted because it was protected by a
privilege.
75. 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
76. Id. at 379.
77. Ibid.
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later be used in court. "For the unwary spouse who speaks freely, repudia-
tion would prove a trap; for the wily, a vehicle for making self-serving dec-
larations."78
3. Expanding the Involuntary Confession Concept
In People v. Quinn,"' defendant was indicted for armed robbery, auto-
mobile theft and possession of narcotics. His plea of guilty to the robbery
charge was accepted and the other charges were dismissed. Then a proba-
tion officer conducted a pre-sentence interview during which he induced
defendant to make certain admissions by telling him that if he did not tell
the truth, he would not be recommended for probation. Afterwards, the
defendant changed his mind and pleaded not guilty to the robbery charge.
The court promptly reinstated the other two charges, and the defendant
pleaded not guilty to all three. During the trial, the probation officer testi-
fied, over objection, that during the interview the defendant had ad-
mitted committing the alleged crimes and that his motive had been to get
narcotics. The officer also acknowledged that he always told convicted de-
fendants during pre-sentence interviews that probation would not be recom-
mended if they did not tell him the truth. The Supreme Court of California
reversed the trial court's decision because the probation officer's statement
to the defendant constituted a threat or an implied promise of leniency and
therefore his admissions were involuntary and inadmissible."0
In several recent California cases, the courts have examined the circum-
stances surrounding an admission to determine (1) whether a threat or
promise of leniency was made to the accused and (2) whether it was the
cause of the admission. In Quinn, however, the court did not attempt to
determine if the probation officer's statement was the cause of the defen-
dant's admission but instead assumed this as a fact. The fact that "the court
did not inquire into the issue of actual inducement suggests that the expla-
nation for excluding Quinn's admissions lies not so much in their involun-
tary character as in the fact that they resulted from a pre-sentence proba-
tion interview."'" If the admission was excluded because it was made
during the pre-sentence interview, then the court may have concluded that
78. Ibid.
79. 61 Cal. 2d 551, 39 Cal. Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705 (1964). For an informative
case comment on the Quinn case, see 17 STAN. L. REV. 525 (1965).
80. In California an "involuntary confession is not competent evidence of guilt in a
criminal action and its admission is a ground for reversal." 17 STAN. L. REv. 525, 526
n.3 (1965). Since the only difference between confessions and admissions is the extent
to which they establish the ultimate fact of guilt, the rationale behind the involuntary
confession rule also applied to admissions. Id. at 526 & n.4.
81. Id. at 529.
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statements, or at least admissions, made during such interviews are inadmis-
sible because they are protected by privilege.
D. The Federal Influence
During the great depression, the federal government created many grant-
in-aid programs, most of which are embodied in the Social Security Act. "
The Act stipulated that a state could not receive aid under some of the
programs unless it provided "safeguards" to protect information gained
through certain agency-participant relationships.8 But what "safeguards"
are required is unclear, for the Social Security Act provides no explanation.
The Supreme Court of Washington is the only court which has inter-
preted the safeguard provisions. It has rendered two decisions which seem
rather inconsistent with the apparent plain meaning of the federal statute.
In State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe,"' the judge in a juvenile proceeding
subpoenaed the records of the Washington Department of Welfare concern-
ing a delinquent minor. The department refused to produce the records on
the ground that they were privileged under regulations of the State Depart-
ment of Social Security; it did, however, submit a summary of its records
implying that this would satisfy the "safeguards" language of the relevant
federal statute. The judge ruled that he knew on the basis of past experi-
ence that such summaries were inadequate and inaccurate"s and ordered
82. For an informative discussion of the federal influence see LoGatto, Privileged
Communications and the Social Worker, 8 CATHOLIC LAw. 5 (1962).
83. Social Security Act § 2(a) (8), 53 Stat. 1360 (1939), 42 U.S.C. § 302(a) (7)
(1964) (safeguards needed for old age assistance and medical assistance for aged);
Social Security Act § 402(a) (8), 53 Stat. 1379 (1939), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (1964)
(safeguards needed for aid to needy families with children); Social Security Act §
1002(a) (9), 53 Stat. 1397 (1939), 42 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (9) (1964) (safeguards needed
for aid to the blind); Social Security Act § 1402(a) (9), 64 Stat. 555 (1950), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1352(a) (9) (1964) (safeguards needed for aid to permanently and totally disabled);
Social Security Act § 1602(a) (7), 76 Stat. 198 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (7) (1964)
(safeguards needed for aid to blind, aged, disabled, and medical assistance for aged).
These statutes specify that information can be used only for purposes related to those for
which it was obtained. Social Security Act § 404(2), 49 Stat. 628 (1935), 42 U.S.C.
§ 604(a) (2) (1964) provides that payments to states which do not comply with the
federal requirements may be stopped.
84. 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946).
85. The judge wanted the original files for the following reasons:
(1) in at least one prior summary which had been submitted to the court by the
welfare department, "gross errors of fact were included, and the conclusions drawnfrom them were dangerously inaccurate;" (2) such summaries rarely show the
source of the information included therein, and hence there is no way to de-
termine the relative weight of the evidence on which the social worker based
his or her opinion; (3) partly because of the shortage of qualified help, the county
welfare department has been unable to supply such summaries within a reason-
able time, whereas the original records could, in every case, be promptly pro-
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the welfare administrator to produce the department's original records or
be held in contempt. The administrator, nevertheless, refused to obey the
court order.
On appeal the Washington Department of Welfare made two arguments.
First, it contended that the records were privileged under rules promulgated
by the State Department of Social Security pursuant to authority granted it
by the state legislature. In answer, the court held that the original records
of the welfare department did not constitute privileged communications
because Wigmore's second and fourth conditions were not met.8"
The department also argued that since federal aid might be discontinued
if the records were disclosed, Congress must have intended that the state
enact a privilege. This contention was based upon a portion of the federal
Social Security Act which required that:
A State plan for aid to dependent children must.., provide safeguards
which restrict the use or disclosure of information concerning applica-
cants and recipients to purposes directly connected with the adminis-
tration of aid to dependent children." (Emphasis added.)
In dispelling the department's fears, the court said that it did not believe
that the Social Security Act contemplated a restriction against disclosure
under the circumstances presented by the case. Evidently it was referring
to facts which it had noted earlier: (1) that the juvenile court would need
to consider the financial condition of the child's parents and grandparents
and the person or persons to whose custody he would eventually be as-
signed," and (2) that since the records of the juvenile courts were confi-
dential, the information would not be disclosed to the public.8 " The court
concluded that it did not believe that any federal board would terminate
assistance "simply because the juvenile courts are given access to the records
of the county welfare department for judicial inspection and use in matters
vitally affecting those for whom such public assistance is required."9
In State v. Church," ten defendants were charged with rape. The State
Department of Social Security was ordered to deposit certain records with
the prosecuting and defense attorneys. The department administrator twice
refused to obey the court and was finally directed to show cause why he
duced; and (4) summaries are usually prepared by persons who are untrained
workers and whose summary reports are therefore inadequate. Id. at 164, 169,
P.2d at 708.
86. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
87. State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 165, 169 P.2d 706, 708
(1946).
88. id. at 169, 169 P.2d at 710.
89. Id. at 169, 169 P.2d at 711.
90. Id. at 170, 169 P.2d at 711.
91. 35 Wash. 2d 170, 211 P.2d 701 (1949).
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should not be held in contempt. Before the Supreme Court of Washington,
the administrator argued that the records were privileged under regulations
of the State Department of Social Security. The court held that the privi-
lege applied only to voluntary and not involuntary disclosures."2 Here too,
the department had expressed a fear that federal aid might be withheld if
the records were admitted into evidence. The court admitted that this case
could be distinguished from Smythe, since the records of a criminal proceed-
ing are open to public scrutiny. But it concluded that, because its primary
duty was to assure accused defendants a fair trial, which includes "the
right to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
their own behalf ... ",9 it could not properly consider the possible loss of
federal aid.
In 1951, Congress amended the Social Security Act by adding an anti-
confidentiality clause:
No State ... shall be deprived of any grant-in-aid or other payment
to which it otherwise is or has become entitled ... by reason of the
enactment or enforcement by such State of any legislation prescribing
any conditions under which public access may be had to records for the
disbursement of any such funds or payments within such State,
if such legislation prohibits the use of any list or names obtained
through such access to such records for commercial or political pur-
poses." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it appears that records of payments are not safeguarded unless
such information is sought for "commercial or political purposes.""5 But
an important unanswered question is what constitutes proper safeguards to
protect information other than that pertaining to disbursement of govern-
ment funds, for instance information which an applicant has given to an
agency in order to qualify for aid.
It is impossible to determine the extent to which the federal enactments
have encouraged state legislatures to enact privileges for specific agency-
92. Id. at 172, 211 P.2d at 702; see note 61 supra and accompanying text.
93. Id. at 176, 211 P.2d at 704.
94. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 618, 65 Stat. 569.
95. See Coopersberg v. Taylor, 148 Misc. 824, 266 N.Y. Supp. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1933)
where a similar state anti-confidentiality statute conflicted with a statutory privilege
which made information respecting the receipt of public relief confidential at the discre-
tion of the Commissioner of Relief. The court said that these two statutes should be
read in conjunction with each other. It concluded that the public policy expressed by
the confidentiality statute was to protect the identity of persons accepting relief so that
future applicants would not be discouraged and that the legislature intended that this
proscription should include inspection by taxpayers.
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participant relations or inspired the agencies themselves to adopt policies of
confidentiality, but quite possibly they have exerted considerable influence.9"
IV. Is A PRIVILEGE NEEDED? 97
A. Efforts by the Profession to Compensate for Lack of Privilege"8
There is some evidence that agencies and social workers, in response to
the present lack of privilege, sometimes practice tactics designed to protect
their records, or at least the more confidential aspects of them, from forced
disclosure in court. One social welfare administrator stated that
when actually faced with court orders to produce information con-
tained in agency records, social work administrators have used various
devices to avoid relinquishing their material. Pleading a relationship
of confidence with the client was a first step; if that failed, they not
infrequently used their case record material selectively and submitted
only verified fact sheet and other factual material. " When the case in
question involved a medical or psychiatric social work agency, the ad-
ministrators sometimes hid behind the doctor-patient privilege, since
the social work data could not be extricated from the medical and
96. That the federal statutes have some influence is demonstrated in State ex rel.
Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946). The court pointed out
that the enactment of the state statute which gave the State Department of Social Se-
curity the power to promulgate rules to safeguard information was a result of the federal
statute.
97. This section is substantially based upon Green & Richardson (unpublished paper)
and (unpublished survey).
98. Lack of privileged communications was viewed as a problem by forty-five percent
of the agencies interviewed; forty percent replied that lack of privilege had never caused
any difficulty; and fifteen percent had no problem because they were privileged by statute.
Of the agencies interviewed, those which were most often subpoenaed were ones which
dealt with children and family problems.
The policies which were followed in the event an agency was subpoenaed to produce
its records or one of its employees was subpoenaed to testify corresponded to those dis-
cussed in the text. A special problem arose in hospitals since medical, psychiatric and
social work information was often all found on the same record. Thus, a subpoena com-
manding production of one kind of information would also force disclosure of the other
kinds. In one hospital where medical records are frequently subpoenaed, the other kinds
of information are removed before the record is taken into court. Although it was not
clear from the interview, a similar policy would probably be followed as to the medical
and psychiatric information if the social work material was demanded. Another hospital
at least partially avoided such problems by suggesting that social workers and psy-
chiatrists judiciously record on the hospital records only that information necessary to the
medical staff. Green & Richardson (unpublished survey).
99. In State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1949),
the trial judge ruled that he knew from his past experience that such summaries of
records are inadequate. For his reasons see note 85 supra.
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psychiatric data; or they escaped disclosure because of the fact that
their information was largely hearsay."'
One writer suggests that "records can easily become mislaid or lost [or] in-
advertently destroyed. The caseworker, due to the great number of cases
and her heavy work load, can have difficulty in remembering anything
particular about this client."' Another author suggests that some agencies
keep double records; one set for their own use and another for the courts. "'
Finally, when agencies are ordered to produce records they generally at-
tempt to persuade the serving attorney to withdraw the subpoena by telling
him that the information in the records would be harmful to his client's
case.
L s
When a social worker is subpoenaed to testify in court from his personal
knowledge, he may attempt to avoid appearing by explaining to the serving
attorney that his testimony might not be beneficial to the attorney's client.0
There is no evidence as to how frequently social workers who are unable to
avoid testifying "have difficulty remembering anything about" their clients
but it may be that social workers are often blessed with bad memories or,
more accurately, their clients are blessed.
B. The Profession's Arguments for a Privilege
The social work profession has advanced two major arguments in sup-
port of a privilege: (1) that confidentiality is a prerequisite to establishing
the necessary relationship with the client and (2) that there is a serious
danger that the court and the jury will incorrectly interpret the information
and opinions contained in the records or included in the social worker's
testimony.
The profession contends that confidentiality is "necessary for effective
casework service"' 05 because the social worker must often ascertain his
client's innermost feelings about himself, his family and close friends, and
the community.106 In order to obtain such information, the social worker
100. Miller, The Confidential Relationship in Social Welfare Administration, 69 NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WELFARE PROCEEDINGS 574, 575 (1942).
101. Barnett, Confidentiality and Legal Privilege 8 (unpublished paper in possession
of Judge Barnett, Judge of the Superior Court of San Jose, California).
102. Green & Richardson 23 (unpublished paper).
103. Green & Richardson 21 (unpublished survey).
104. Ibid.
105. BIESTExK, THE CASEWORK RELATIONSHIP 121 (1957).
106. Social work touches human life more intimately in many ways than many
of the other helping and healing professions. The caseworker . . . is frequently
the observer and regularly the recipient of confidential information concerning
the client and his family.... This may include, in some cases, his innermost feel-
ings, which he wants no one else to know about. Id. at 120-21.
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must usually explicitly or impliedly assure his client that his statements will
not be revealed for purposes detrimental to his interests." 7 Such informa-
tion, if revealed to persons other than the social worker, could not only
prove embarrassing to the client, but might also seriously harm his reputa-
tionl"s and cause his already tenuous relationship with his family'0 9 or the
community to become even more unsatisfactory. In addition, the working
relation between the social worker and his client is frequently destroyed by
disclosure,110 and many social workers feel that other social worker-client
relations are harmed as well, particularly those with the case worker who
testified."" Furthermore,
if a social agency discloses information about individuals without their
consent, those needing its services will probably apply for them only
under urgent necessity and will give reluctantly the information re-
quired by the agency to provide service. . .. Thus, unless a social
agency discharges its obligation to confidentiality, it will be prevented
from achieving its maximum purposes for the benefit of individuals
and of society." 2
107. "He communicates this secret information upon the condition, at least implicitly
made, that it is necessary for the help that he is seeking. He assumes that the informa-
tion will not go beyond the persons engaged in helping him." BIESTEK, op. cit. supra
note 105, at 121. "The establishment of this relationship is dependent on gaining the
complete trust of the client [which is attained through] ... assurance[s] of confidentiality."
Green & Richardson 6 (unpublished paper). "In situations which involve marriage
counseling, in particular those which may include divorce proceedings, it is very important
that the counselor be able to assure the client of confidentiality." Id. at 12.
108. "He definitely does not want to exchange his reputation for the casework help
he is seeking." BESTEKp, op. cit. supra note 105, at 121.
109. If this information is disclosed by the social worker, family relations may de-
teriorate. Comm. on Psychiatry and Law, Confidentiality and Privileged Communi-
cation in the Practice of Psychiatry, 45 GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY
95 (1960); Goldberg, Social Work and Law, 7 CHILDREN 168 (1960).
110. Green & Richardson 19 (unpublished paper).
111. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 1027 (Lurie ed. 1965).
112. AMERICAN Ass'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, PRINCIPLES OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN
SOCIAL WORK 4 (1964). "Unless people in trouble, coming to a social agency, can feel
full faith and confidence and implicit trust in the prudence and integrity of the worker,
this institution of civilized society would be severely crippled, if not destroyed." LoGatto,
supra note 82, at 12.
[Because] our social institutions do not work perfectly... society has set up social
agencies. If these agencies should put rules and regulations of other institutions
ahead of everything else, (e.g., the right to compel testimony] they could not serve
the purposes for which they are called into being and thus they would fail not only
individuals but society as well. American Ass'n of Social Workers, The Use of
Case Records, The Compass, Nov. 1942, p. 9, 16.
"Obviously, without a basis of confidence, important details that are intimately related
to the client's problems and their solution may remain undisclosed." FAMILY SERVICE
ASS'N OF AMERICA, THE LAWYER AND THE SOCIAL WORKER 17-18 (1959).
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The profession feels so strongly about the necessity for confidentiality
that each member of the National Association of Social Workers is bound
by this oath:
I respect the privacy of the people I serve.
I use in a responsible manner information gained in professional re-
lationships 1
"The Working Definition of Social Work Practice" further spells out the
manner in which information is to be used by advocating "the strict ob-
servance of confidentiality""' as the first step in setting the stage for com-
petent social work practice. Thus if a social worker is subpoenaed to testify
against his client or to produce records prejudicial to him, he finds himself
in a dilemma"5 arising from the conflict between his professional code of
ethics and his loyalty to his client and the judicial search for truth to which
he is bound as a member of society. His predicament is concisely summed
up in the following: "The duty to keep matters confidential is governed by
ethics. The right to refuse to disclose them is governed by law.""
The second argument which has been advanced is that the social work-
er's testimony or records will be incorrectly interpreted. Of course, if the
social worker is allowed to testify as an expert witness, he can probably
reduce this danger to a minimum. If not, then it is likely that a misunder-
standing may arise because of (1) the technical nature of the information
and (2) the client's statements were made neither in court nor under oath;
therefore, his statements may not be applicable to the court situation. 17
113. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 1027 (Lurie ed. 1965).
"Respect for the confidential nature of information obtained through professional
contact is a cardinal principle of practice in religion, medicine, law, as well as in social
case work." Goldberg, The Confidential Relationship in Public Relief Administration,
Social Work Today, June-July 1941, p. 25. "Ethical standards in social work adminis-
tration have long required that the confidential relationship of client and social worker
be protected." Miller, supra note 100, at 574.
114. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 1030 (Lurie ed. 1965).
115. [C]omrnunications between social workers and their clients, in the absence
of statute, are not confidential-that is, a social worker may be compelled to tell
or, by refusing, may suffer the punishment of contempt of court or otherwise, which
may be applied in the particular case. This is an entirely different question from
the one as to whether a social worker is morally obligated to tell. BRADWAY, LAW
AND SOCIAL WORK 100 (1929).
"The fear of subpoena... is ever present in social work practice and has created con-
flicts of an ethical nature both for agencies and individual workers." Sprafkin, A New
Look at Confidentiality, 40 SOCIAL CASEWORK 87, 88 (1959); see Green & Richardson
6-7 (unpublished paper).
116. Barnett, op. cit. supra note 101, at 3.
117. Whitebrook, The Professional Confidence in the Casework Relationship, 26
Tnn FAmLY 256 (1945). It has also been suggested that perhaps the:
greatest peril [of allowing records to be examined is] the fact that it might
be possible for an attorney to examine them for information, without ever intend-
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The first reason is more applicable to examinations of records than testi-
mony given in court, since a testifying social worker will probably attempt
to explain himself in a manner understandable to laymen. Records, how-
ever, contain not only a client's actions and statements, but also impressions
of a client which the social worker gains during the interview, tentative
conclusions which he draws, and techniques which he feels might be ad-
visable in the future. These materials, often written in technical terms, are
nothing more than working aids which help the social worker to serve his
client. However, the layman upon reading these materials or hearing them
recited might well conclude that they represent final conclusions and un-
controverted facts.
The gist of the second reason is simply that a candid answer given to a
question in one context is not necessarily the answer that would be given
to the same question or a similar one if asked in a different context; yet both
answers can be equally honest and accurate because they were elicited under
different circumstances.118
The thrust of the second argument, the danger that the information in
the records or the social worker's testimony may be misinterpreted, is essen-
tially that such information should be excluded because it is unreliable or
apt to be prejudicial or misleading. This argument is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether a privilege should be granted, for a privilege is justified
because the social utility and desirability of a particular relationship is so
great that it outweighs society's interest in determining the truth, not be-
cause the information shielded is unreliable or prejudicial.
The argument proffered that confidentiality is necessary for effective
casework does go to the question of whether a privilege is justified. How-
ing to present the records in court. This could provide an excellent basis for cross-
examination of the client and enable the opposition to the client to be pre-
pared to present damaging matters. Barnett, op. cit. supra note 101, at 6.
118. For example, suppose that a social worker undertaking marriage counseling asks
a husband what it is about his wife that makes it so difficult for him to continue living
with her. The man answers that he once found her physically attractive but not so
any longer, that he has not achieved sexual satisfaction with her for several years and
has often contemplated relations with other women, that he is unwilling to confide in
her anymore and that he has in recent months frequently been tempted to leave her.
It is an understatement to say that he has indicated that he is unsatisfied with his mar-
riage and is likely to commit adultery, desert his wife or seek a divorce. Yet these state-
ments made in a moment of candid release are thoughts which many men may feel at
one time or another during marriage. Such feelings are not grounds for divorce unless
carried into action, and the same client, if asked the same question in the sober and re-
straining atmosphere of a courtroom, might say that he still loves his wife, intends to be
faithful to her and would not think of leaving her. And who can say that he is not
being equally as truthful at that moment?
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ever, this contention concerns only one of the four tests which must be satis-
fied before a privilege is granted-whether the element of confidentiality is
essential "to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.""1 9
C. An Examination and Application of the
Requirements for Privilege
Wigmore's four fundamental conditions have been accepted "as neces-
sary to the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communi-
cations."'"0 These requirements can be criticized as ambiguous."" How-
ever, this ambiguity may partially explain their universal acceptance since
it allows the requirements to be used as a flexible framework within which
the law of privilege can be expanded or contracted.
1. "The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed."
Wigrnore makes no attempt to define "in a confidence." For purposes
of this note "in a confidence" is defined as applying to a relationship in
which the anticipation is that information will not be disclosed to persons
not involved in the treatment of a client. This definition permits the infor-
mation to be given to persons not employed by the agency who must be
consulted during diagnosis and treatment.
When anyone reveals his innermost feelings about himself, his family and
his closest friends, he naturally desires that his statements be kept secret;
but it is a different thing to say that he is confident that they will be. Thus
it is arguable whether the expectancy of confidentiality in the social worker-
client relationship is inherent or emanates from the social worker's explicit
or implicit assurances of secrecy. 22 If evidence were uncovered which re-
119. 8 WiGioRE § 2285, at 527.
120. Ibid.
121. For a criticism of these guideposts see Note, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
Does injury to the relation, for example, mean injury to a particular attorney-client
relationship or to all such relationships? What is an injury? How is it to be
measured? Will denying the privilege necessarily increase the chances of correctly
disposing of litigation? Does it mean this piece of litigation or all litigation? By
what standard is benefit to be measured and how is it to be weighed against in-jury? Who makes up the community whose opinion is to be looked to in order
to find out if the relation is to be "sedulously fostered" (and what does that phrase
mean)? Do you look to the "moral sense" of the community or ask the "ethical
leaders" of the community you choose? Is that community the nation, state, or
locality? These questions, and they are illustrative rather than exhaustive, show
how ambiguous the Wigmore criteria are.
These four pillars for privilege neither explain nor justify the rule. If these four
guideposts were the sole determinants of privilege, a corollary would be the finding
that any relationship not privileged lacked these talismanic attributes. Id. at 1230.
122. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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vealed that the majority of clients do not go to a social worker expecting
confidentiality but only desiring it, then some doubt would exist as to
whether the social work profession fulfills Wigmore's first requirement.
However, the answer may be that because the social worker probably as-
sures his client of confidentiality at the outset of an interview, most com-
munications are made after a "confidence that they will not be disclosed"
has been established, thus satisfying the requirement.
But it may be that at least some clients come to the social workers know-
ing that they have no privilege, because they have consulted a lawyer in
contemplation of litigation or are already experienced in such matters.
Communications made under such circumstances could never originate "in
a confidence that they will not be disclosed."
2. "This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance of the relation between the parties."
The social work profession contends that confidentiality is necessary to
effective casework because of the personal information that must be gained
about the client. Two basic assumptions allegedly compel this position.
If there is a chance that information about a client may later be disclosed,
a client (1) will not seek help except out of absolute necessity, and (2)
even if he does seek help, he will conceal relevant information which will
prevent the social worker from fully serving his client. No statistical evidence
was uncovered which supported or weakened these assumptions, but com-
mon sense apparently supports them. Because many persons who seek the
aid of social workers are on the verge of running afoul of the law or becom-
ing involved in litigation, they would naturally be reluctant to reveal infor-
mation that might later prove damaging in court, if they knew that the
social worker could be compelled to disclose such facts.1" ' If such informa-
tion were essential to treatment of the client, the social worker would be
thwarted.
3. "This relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered."
Perhaps the phrase "because it is socially useful and desirable" ought to
be added to this requirement, as it actually demands an examination of the
role of the particular relation in the community. Some of the people who
seek the services of social caseworkers are
married couples, torn by discord or temporarily in conflict with each
other; parents baffled by their child's behavior or distressed over their
123. Green & Richardson 2 (unpublished paper); id. at 26-27 (unpublished survey).
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relationship with him; childless couples who want to complete their
family through adoption; unmarried mothers who need help in plan-
ning for their own and their child's future; persons of all ages who,
owing to unemployment, chronic illness, or desertion require public
assistance funds in order to maintain a normal life; industrial workers
beset by difficulties that are endangering their capacity to hold a job;
persons whose lives have been disrupted by long or severe illnesses or
incapacity and who need help in regaining their place in society;
adolescents who need guidance in choice of a vocation or in making
healthy social relations and whose ties with their parents are strained
[and] aging persons who need to readjust their lives following retire-
ment or who are incapacitated by illness."'
If the social work profession is capable of helping such persons learn to
make their lives more useful to themselves and society, then there is little
doubt that the social worker-client relationship "ought to be sedulously fos-
tered." If it is not able to help them, then no privilege should be granted.
4. "The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation."
Application of this requirement necessitates a value judgment-balancing
the injury that will be done to the relationship by disclosure plus the fre-
quency with which disclosures may occur, against the benefit gained by the
correct disposal of litigation. Naturally, the working relation between a
social worker and his client is destroyed whenever the social worker testifies
against his client. Also, many social workers feel that other social worker-
client relationships will also be harmed, especially relations with the case-
worker who testified.
12 5
Judging by the scarcity of reported cases in which a social worker-client
privilege was at issue, it can be assumed that caseworkers are not frequently
compelled to testify.126 However, since many clients come from the lower
economic stratum, it may be that they simply cannot afford the expense of
an appeal.2 It is also possible that social workers have become so inured to
the absence of privilege that they simply plead bad memories and lost rec-
ords without bothering to assert confidentiality.
28
Against these facts and speculations as to the harm that results from
forced disclosure and the frequency with which disclosure occurs, society's
124. FAMILY SERVICE ASS'N OF AMIEmCA, op. cit. supra note 112, at 14-15.
125. See notes 108-11 supra and accompanying text.
126. See note 98 supra.
127. See Green & Richardson 2 (unpublished paper).
128. See notes 100-04 supra and accompanying text.
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interest in the correct disposal of litigation must be balanced. That inter-
est is obviously great, but does not seem to have a constant value, i.e., soci-
ety as a whole has a greater interest in the correct disposal of a charge of
murder than it has in a charge of peace disturbance arising from a marital
quarrel. Thus the answer to Wigmore's fourth requirement can be viewed
as depending upon the facts of the particular case rather than a predeter-
mined evaluation. For example, the correct disposal of the murder charge
probably outweighs any injury that would inure to the social worker-client
relation. But the desirability of preserving a marriage of thirty years seems
to override the benefit which would be gained by the correct disposal of the
charge of peace disturbance.
It should also be noted that permitting a privilege will not hinder a de-
termination of the truth whenever there exists enough evidence from other
sources. Society's interests will be satisfied regardless of whether the privi-
lege is allowed, and this fact seems to support granting a privilege in such
cases.
V. CONSIDERATIONS IN DRAFTING A STATUTE
In extending protection to a new professional relationship, the courts and
legislatures have generally failed to examine the characteristics and needs
of the particular relation and have instead, granted substantially the same
protection as afforded by the attorney-client privilege."'5 Such an approach
129. The statutes granting a privilege to the psychologist-client relation are a good
example of this. All of the following specifically place the privilege on the same basis as
the attorney-client privilege: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1516 (1947); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2904; GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3118 (1955); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:19
(Supp. 1963); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 7611; TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1117 (1955); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 18.83.110 (1961). Also, Kentucky has enacted a new statute putting
the psychologist-client relationship on the same basis as an attorney-client relationship.
Ky. Acts 1964, ch. 155, § 13.
Statutes giving substantially the same privilege to the relationship, though not specifi-
cally equating it to the attorney-client privilege, include: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-
1-7(7) (Supp. 1961); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.677(18) (Supp. 1963); UTAH CODE
ANN, § 58-25-9 (1953).
The typical lawyer-client privilege, either by statute or through the common law, in-
cludes the following factors:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal ad-
visor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose,(4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the
protection be waived. 8 WIGMORE § 2292, at 554.
Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Profession and the Law of Privileged Communications,
10 WAYNE L. REv. 609, 654 (1964), thinks that these new statutes which do not con-
sider the need of a particular profession "will have in the long run a harmful rather
than beneficial effect." See generally Louisell, The Psychologists in Today's Legal World,
41 MINN. L. REv. 731 (1957).
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seems highly undesirable because the needs of each relationship and the
problems of adequate protection differ. Therefore, the following sections
of this note will attempt to determine what aspects of the social worker-
client relationship should be protected and what safeguards are required
to protect them.
A. What Relationship?
In determining what relationship should be protected, the legislature 3 '
has several choices: the social worker-client relation, the agency-client rela-
tion or some combination of the two, such as the relation between a social
worker who practices exclusively through an agency and his client.
If the privilege is granted to the social worker-client relationship, then it
is necessary to determine who qualifies as a social worker. The standard
could be based upon (1) the professional training and experience of the
individual or (2) the function which a social worker performs. The first
alternative appears to be the more desirable because it could be drafted in
such a way as to guarantee a minimum standard of competency. The Na-
tional Association of Social Workers has defined the minimum requirements
for a professional social worker as the attainment of a bachelor's degree and
a master's degree in social work plus two years of professional experience
in one agency. 1' Another alternative is to license social workers through
the state and permit only communications with licensed social workers to
be privileged.1 3 2
A few attempts have been made to draft a statute or administrative rule tailored to
a particular profession. For example, a North Carolina statute granting a privilege to
the doctor-patient relationship apparently reflects the criticism of the doctor-patient
privilege and grants the privilege only at the discretion of the trial judge. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-53 (1953). For a criticism of the doctor-patient privilege see 8 WxoIGon §
2380(a); Note, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 76 (1955). Also Mo. DEP'T oF PunLma HEALTH &
WELFARE, REGULATIONS AND CODES FOR MATERNITY HOSPITALS § 3, No. 6(7) (1961)
apparently considers the particular needs of the social worker-unwed mother relation.
See note 45 supra.
130. It is assumed that the extension of a privilege to a new relationship is more
properly the function of the legislature than the courts because of the political, social,
economic and philosophical considerations presented. For a discussion of this point by the
leading authorities in the field see Louisell & Crippin, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN.
L. REv. 413 (1956).
131. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 15 (Lurie ed. 1965).
132. At least three jurisdictions have licensed social workers. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 9000-30; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 20, §§ 821-50 (1961); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN.
§§ 5-39-1 to -25 (Supp. 1964).
Lawyers, doctors, and psychologists who have been granted the advantages of privileged
communications are licensed, and therefore the enactment of a licensing statute for social
workers might be a prerequisite to obtaining a privilege.
New York upheld the licensing of psychologists in National Psychological Ass'n for
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Any effort to define social workers according to their function alone
presents problems which may be insurmountable, since other groups such
as lawyers, clergymen and teachers often perform similar functions.' Fur-
thermore, such an approach makes it difficult to establish a distinction be-
tween the competent and the incompetent, since individuals could easily
purport to perform the requisite functions without possessing the necessary
professional training and experience. Still, it might be proposed that a
privilege be granted to all psychotherapist-client relations with psycho-
therapy being viewed as a function performed by psychologists, psychiatrists
and social workers, although there is some debate as to whether the social
work profession has gained acceptance as a psychotherapeutic profession. 4
Granting protection to the agency-client relationship3 . avoids many of
the problems discussed above, because it restricts the privilege to fewer and
more specific relationships. But this approach naturally presents the ques-
tion of which agencies deserve to be privileged, since it can be argued that
confidentiality is more necessary in some areas than others. For example,
it is not necessary that a man applying for job retraining reveal as much
confidential and potentially embarrassing or prejudicial information as a
woman applying for monetary assistance under an Aid to Dependent Chil-
Psychoanalysis v. University of the State, 8 N.Y.2d 197, 168 N.E.2d 649, 203 N.Y.S.2d
821 (1960).
133. The only jurisdiction that has attempted to define the practice of social work is
Puerto Rico:
For the purposes of sections 821-850 of this ritle, "social worker" shall be any
erson who, after meeting the academic and professional requirements set forth
erein, is engaged in employing the social resources at his disposal for the benefit
of a person, family, or community having specific needs, in order to assist in solv-
ing its problems of health, education, poverty, delinquency, neglect, want of pro-
tection, mental defects or diseases, physical disability, and social or environmen-
tal deficiencies. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 20, § 848 (1961).
134. In fact, one proposed statute giving a privilege to the psychotherapist-client
relation granted protection only to psychologists and medical doctors who practice psy-
chotherapy. 6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMm., REPORTS, RECOMmENDATIONS, AND
STuDms 237 (1964). Fisher, supra note 129, at 643, defines a psychotherapist as "a
person skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of problems as the result of professional
training in the behavioral sciences for that purpose. 'Psychotherapist' shall also be inter-
preted to include a person reasonably believed by a patient to be so qualified."
All of the functions performed by a social worker are not psychotherapeutic. For
example, a social worker who investigates an applicant for welfare payments is not per-
forming a psychotherapeutic function. The privilege should be limited to social workers
undertaking psychotherapeutic tasks. This could be accomplished by two different means:
(1) giving the privilege to all licensed social workers who practice psychotherapy; or
(2) licensing particular kinds of social workers engaged in psychotherapy. See Rosen-
heim, Privilege, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Offenders, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 660, 670
(1965); Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1957).
135. See notes 27-43 supra and accompanying text.
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dren program or for information about contraceptives under a birth control
program. Furthermore, granting a privilege to only certain types of agencies
might prove to be an unduly time consuming process which could leave
many deserving agencies without protection because the legislature did not
have time to consider their plight. Finally, worthy agencies might be un-
able to muster sufficient support to induce legislation. But by this approach
the state could readily establish a minimum level of competency among
agencies, if it required that certain conditions be met before a privilege is
available. Another possibility, of course, is to expand licensing requirements
for agencies.
B. Whose Privilege?
Under the present conception of professional-client privilege, the privilege
or right to object to the admission of evidence belongs to the client or pa-
tient, not the professional. 3 Because the admission of evidence might vio-
late a policy of the agency which employs the social worker or decrease a
social worker's capacity to aid other clients, it has been suggested that the
social worker also be allowed to object to the admission of evidence.13 This
is probably justifiable so long as the client also wishes to object. But whose
interests are paramount if the client wishes to waive his privilege, but the
agency or social worker does not?13 Another problem which must be re-
solved is who has the right to object to the admission in evidence of informa-
tion given to the social worker by the client's family or friends. Should the
privilege belong to the client, friends or family, or both?
A special problem arises when the client is a juvenile. Should the child
or the parent or both have the right to claim a privilege? In some situa-
tions it might be desirable to protect the communications between the social
worker and client against disclosure to the parents. In order for parents to
be precluded from acquiring information about their children, the value of
the social worker-juvenile relation must overshadow the right of a parent to
have all relevant information to rear his child. 3"
C. When Privileged?
The granting of a privilege to clients of social workers may be limited
only to certain types of proceedings. One statute has restricted the privilege
136. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
137. See Fisher, supra note 129, at 643-44.
138. 6 CAL. LAW REVISION CoI M., op. cit. supra note 134, at 238, gives a privilege
to the psychotherapists, but the patient has the right to waive it.
139. Cf. Van Allen v. McCleary, 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
See generally LoGatto, Privileged Communications and the Social Worker, 8 CATHOLIC
LAW. 5 (1962).
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to civil suits as opposed to criminal prosecutions.'40 The justification for
this distinction appears to be that in a criminal case society's interests in
retribution, rehabilitation, detention and prevention are at stake and the
correct disposal of litigation is of overriding significance. Therefore, a
privilege should not be permitted to obstruct the introduction of relevant
facts into evidence. However, in civil suits other considerations, such as the
values comprehended by the social worker-client relation, may outweigh
the impediments to the correct disposal of litigation caused by a privilege.
Another possibility may be to allow a privilege in a public trial but to deny
it in a closed proceeding such as a juvenile court hearing.' In a public
proceeding, disclosure of confidential information may result in public em-
barrassment and loss of reputation as well as the imposition of some sort of
criminal penalty or civil judgment. But in a closed proceeding, only the
latter danger is present. But if the purpose of a privilege is to encourage
individuals to communicate freely with social workers, this distinction be-
tween open and closed hearings does not seem valid in cases in which the
client may fear a civil judgment or a criminal penalty. However, if the
only possible harm to the client is public humiliation or loss of reputation,
this distinction is sound.
D. What Information?
Under all other professional privileges only certain types of information
are protected. But it might be suggested that the social worker-client privi-
lege should encompass all information about the client, including his iden-
tity, regardless of whether it is recorded or part of the social worker's un-
recorded knowledge. This approach would shield all information gathered
from the client as well as from his family and close friends so long as it was
gathered in an atmosphere of confidentiality; also the impressions of and
conclusions about the client arrived at by the social worker would be pro-
tected.
Such protection seems far too broad. Such a degree of confidentiality has
not been extended to any other professional relation. Even the attorney-
client relationship, which presents at least as great a need for secrecy, is not
deemed to merit such protection."' The attorney-client privilege has been
so frequently and closely evaluated during its long existence that if such
sweeping confidentiality were necessary, it surely would have been rec-
ognized and granted by now.
140. See note 51 supra. Of course no privilege exists if social work was not being
practiced.
141. See State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946).
142. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
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Thus, it is necessary to examine in detail the various kinds of information
which a social worker might obtain and to discuss the desirability of
shielding each type. It is repetitious, but worth repeating at this point, that
information not given in an atmosphere of confidentiality should not be
privileged. But an exception might be the identity of the client. It is not
included in any professional-client privilege, but because there may some-
times be a social stigma attached to visiting a social worker, it might be
desirable to shield the identity of clients. 4 ' Another problem is whether
the privilege should be limited to the records of the interview or should also
extend to personal knowledge about a client which the social worker gains
during interviews. To distinguish between the two would violate the spirit
of confidentiality in which the information was given. Furthermore, to
compel the social worker to testify about facts which he remembers while
protecting such information if it is recorded, would render the privilege
an illusion."' It is submitted that this problem is best analyzed on the basis
of reliability of evidence rather than privilege. 14 1
Another problem is whether information gained from the client's family
or friends should be privileged. This depends upon what constitutes the
social worker-client relationship. If a narrow view is adopted, i.e., the rela-
tionship is defined as encompassing only communications between the social
worker and his client, then this information is not privileged. However, if
the social worker-client relationship is defined as including all persons who
can help solve the client's problem, then a privilege should exist for this
information.
Statements of intent to commit future crimes and torts have been ex-
cluded from privileges in the past,"' but in certain situations it might be
desirable to include such information in the social worker-client privilege.147
The situations which might arise fall into two broad categories: (1) where
the social worker voluntarily or involuntarily discloses information about
the future crime in order to prevent its commission, and (2) where the
information was given about a proposed crime which was subsequently
committed.
One possible factual situation within the first category is where X and Y
143. See 8 WIGMORE § 2313. In adoption proceedings the names of children are
falsified for their protection. See In re Adoption of Stowe, 16 Fla. Supp. 91 (Cir. Ct.
1960); In re Adoption of Helm, 6 Fla. Supp. 38 (Cir. Ct. 1953).
144. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text.
146. See UNIFORm RULES OF EVMENcE 26, 27 which state that future crimes and
torts disclosed to doctors and lawyers should not be privileged.
147. See Fisher, supra note 129, at 631-34.
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conspire to commit a murder. Then X goes to a social worker and tells him
what he and Y are planning. If the social worker reports this to the police,
an attempt may be made to prosecute X and Y for conspiracy. If the only
evidence that is available is the testimony of the social worker and he is not
allowed to testify, X and Y are still free to commit the murder. In this case,
it seems that there should be no privilege. Another situation that could
arise under category (1) is where a social worker feels that a man should
be committed to a mental institution because he has professed a desire to
commit a certain crime. If the only evidence available to support the com-
mitment is his testimony, then it might be desirable to allow the social
worker to testify.
A possible situation in the second category is where a social worker does
not report a client's intention to commit a crime, but instead attempts un-
successfully to treat the client."' Since the crime has already been com-
mitted before the social worker is subpoenaed to testify, perhaps a privilege
should be allowed. However, it can be argued that if a privilege is granted,
social workers will not be encouraged to report information of future crimes.
E. Waiver
An individual who otherwise would have standing to object to the admis-
sion of evidence loses his right if he waives the privilege.'49 The simplest
way that one can waive the privilege is by contracting it away. If a client
does this with knowledge that the social worker is thus free to testify against
him in court, the contract should be upheld and the privilege considered
waived.
But situations may arise in which a client who had no intention of waiv-
ing his privilege apparently has done so."' One of the basic requirements
of privilege is that the communications be given with the expectation of
present and future confidentiality. Thus, communications voluntarily
made in the presence of a third party or those not expected to be kept
secret are usually not protected.'' A possible exception to this rule should
be for statements made during a group therapy session. If confidentiality
is essential to treatment of those present and they expect that secrecy will
be forever maintained, it would seem that a privilege should still exist. A
148. Ibid. Fisher points out that a psychotherapist should have the discretion to di-
vulge or keep confidential disclosures of future crimes or torts.
149. 8 WIOMORE §2327.
150. See People v. Feuerstein, 161 Misc. 426, 293 N.Y. Supp. 239 (Queens County
Ct. 1936); State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 174-75, 177 P.2d 689, 705-06 (1947).
151. 8 WiGMoRE § 2311.
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similar problem is presented when a social worker in the course of treating
his client reveals, with his permission, confidential information to other in-
dividuals in the agency. Since such intra-agency disclosures are often neces-
sary for the treatment of a client and since everyone in the agency is pledged
to secrecy, it does not appear justifiable to consider this a waiver of privilege.
If the client's permission was not obtained, then the social worker and not
the client has broken confidentiality, and the client's privilege should still
be upheld. But if inter-agency disclosures are made with the client's con-
sent, is the privilege still retained? It would seem so despite the fact that
the other agency is much like a third party, for agreement to such practices
is often a condition which must be met before treatment. Here also, all per-
sons who receive the information are sworn to secrecy. If inter-agency dis-
closures are made without permission, then the situation is substantially
like an unauthorized intra-agency disclosure and the privilege should not be
considered waived.
Finally, questions of waiver may arise when a client testifies in court. The
general rule is that if one testifies about privileged matters he has waived
his privilege.'52 Objection must be made when the question is asked and
before the testimony is given. Furthermore, if one inadvertently divulges
confidential information, he has nevertheless waived his privilege. There
seems to be no reason for not following these rules when a client testifies,
unless he appears without proper legal representation in an informal pro-
ceeding, such as a juvenile proceeding or probation hearings. In these cases,
safeguards should be devised if a privilege is deemed desirable.
CONCLUSION
If a legislature should decide to protect the social worker-client relation-
ship, there are two basic types of statutes which it can enact: (1) a general
or discretionary statute which grants a privilege in broad terms and confers
a great degree of discretion upon the trial judge to determine the scope
and limitations of the privilege, or (2) a statute which specifically spells
out whose privilege, when privileged, etc., and limits the judge's discretion
to deciding whether these standards have been met. The effect of the lat-
ter type of statute is to pre-empt the courts' judgment in certain areas. It
seems to be the more desirable approach in view of (1) the likelihood that
the courts will apply the law of the attorney-client privilege without con-
sidering the needs of the social worker-client relationship, and (2) the ten-
dency of the courts to circumvent the privilege through fine legal distine-
152. Id. § 2328.
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tions and by concluding that, on the facts of the individual case, Wigmore's
requirements are not satisfied. In summary, this approach would deter ju-
dicial circumvention of legislative intent.
The most feasible approach to drafting a statute with specific provisions
is for the legislature to apply Wigmore's requirements in the following man-
ner. (Of course, the legislature must have already decided that the social
worker-client relationship "ought to be sedulously fostered.") The legisla-
ture should first determine when confidentiality is necessary to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship. It is from this perspective that
the specific problems of what relations, what information, and whose
privilege, should be approached.
Next, the fourth requirement should be considered to determine when
the injury to the relationship outweighs society's interest in the correct dis-
posal of litigation. This step involves questions such as whether a privilege
should be allowed in a civil suit but not in a criminal prosecution. At first
glance Wigmore's first requirement seems to be best answered by the court
on the basis of the facts of the case before it. But in view of the tendency of
the courts to disallow a privilege, the legislature might be justified in assum-
ing that, whenever the prescribed relation is established, any and all com-
munications are made in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
The problem of whether the privilege should be extended to the social
worker-client relationship and, if so, what form it should take may admit of
no simple solution. It seems clear that the solution, whatever it may be,
should reflect the combined thinking of the professions of law and social
work, because, although the issue is of major importance to the general pub-
lic, it is of special concern to these two professional groups. The problem is
both legal and non-legal and its solution requires detailed knowledge of the
requirements of law and the needs of social work. Until such a joint effort is
undertaken on a major scale, a satisfactory solution to the problem is un-
likely to be forthcoming.
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